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Some years ago I purchased a few shares of stock of a Cleveland
machine tool manufacturer, named Cyril Bath Company after its major-
ity stockholder, who owned about sixty percent of the voting shares.
Most of the remainder was owned by the public and traded over the
counter. Bath Company was reputed to be very prosperous and likely
to become even more so: more, its padrone was known as a guardian
and sustaining angel of the Reform Democrats in those parts. It seemed
an ideal opportunity for Ethical Investment.
The results of my little flutter were both disappointing and puz-
zling. Although the Company seemed to be doing a brisk business, its
annual reports invariably showed a small loss, or an even smaller profit.
The total distributions to public stockholders over a period of about five
years Consisted of: (a) a five percent stock dividend; (b) one cash
dividend of a nickel per share; (c) two Christmas cards; and (d) an
annual postage stamp, intended to be used to return a signed proxy. (I
pocketed the stamp, for the proxy solicitation did not even disclose the
names of the nominees for whom my proxy was to be cast, much less the
information about their compensation, ownership of Bath's securities,
transactions with the Company, or other invasions of privacy required
by the prying Securities and Exchange Commission in the case of
corporations with 500 or more stockholders.) The market price of the
stock gradually sank to about half what I had paid for it and a still
smaller fraction of the price at which it had originally been sold to the
public.
Enlightenment dawned when I read the opinion of a federal district
court in a suit brought by another minority stockholder.' I was the
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victim of a squeeze-out-what Professor Hodge O'Neal, the greatest
expert on the subject and the author of the present comprehensive and
authoritative treatise,2 terms a "squeezee." 3  The circumstances were
somewhat atypical, for the Bath Company had nearly three hundred
public stockholders and thus was not, strictly speaking, a close corpora-
tion, but the technique-essentially the withholding from the minority
stockholders of both dividends and information-is an old standby of
squeezors, which Professor O'Neal exhaustively describes and analyzes.4
The complaint in substance alleged that the controlling stockholder had
manipulated license agreements with the corporation in such a way as to
eliminate profits, thus lowering the market price; that the defendants
had caused the corporation to purchase large quantitites of its own stock
at the artificially depressed price; and that these and other material facts.
including the existence of the license agreements, had been withheld
from the public investors.
This particular squeeze-out was atypical in another way, in that it
was a good deal less than completely successful. Three factors com-
bined to rescue at least those public investors who had not yet been
squeezed out: a tough public investor with a large (ten percent) minori-
ty interest and a good lawyer; the existence of section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 19345 and the SEC's rule 10b-58
thereunder; and an irritated law professor. The Sixth Circuit held that
the minority stockholder's allegations stated a cause of action under the
statute and rule.7 The irritated professor's contribution, aside from an
amicus brief in the Circuit Court of Appeals, was a suggestion that the
plaintiff donate one share apiece to 250 volunteers from the students,
staff, and faculty of the Yale Law School, thereby raising the number of
stockholders above the 500 level and subjecting the corporation to the
disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.' We wondered whether it
would occur to the squeezor's attorneys to stage a reverse split, or "glue-
up," reducing the single shares to fractional shares which could be called
for cash,0 and whether we would be able to enjoin such a maneuver. But
this intriguing question, and the 10(b) suit itself, were mooted by a
tender offer from a conglomerate to purchase all the shares of all
stockholders for cash in an amount more than double the market price.
2. O'NEn._
3. Id. at v.
4. E.g., id. §§ 3.02, 3.04, 3.09, 3.10, 3.12.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
7. Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969).
8. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (B) (1970).
9. Professor O'Neal has not overlooked this device. See O'NnAL § 5.32.
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The decision to make the offer to everyone, instead of merely buying
Mr. Bath's control block (at a premium) and continuing the squeeze,
may well have been motivated by the company's legal troubles. At any
rate, the remaining minority stockholders (except for a few of the
student donees who decided to frame their certificates as souvenirs) got
out with more or less whole skins, and some of them with a profit. I
strongly suspect that Mr. Bath got a long-term and lucrative employ-
ment contract, and thus did rather better than the public investors, but it
would have been hard to show that such a contract amounted to a
concealed premium and harder to persuade a court -that he was not
entitled to a premium for control.1" The moral of the tale is, I suppose,
that I would probably have caught on quicker if Professor O'Neal's book
had been available at the time.
Usually, however, the squeeze-out problem arises in the close
corporation-i.e. a corporation with no "public" stockholders.'" (The
recent tendency of some publicly held corporations to "go private" poses
a special variety of the problem." ) There is no generally accepted
definition of "close," beyond the very general one that the number of
stockholders is fairly small. (The business itself may be very large, like
the Ford Motor Company, the A & P, or Campbell Soup, before they
went public.) Delaware, which is among the increasing number of
states which make special statutory provision for close corporations (a
development for which Professor O'Neal deserves much of the credit),
sets the maximum at thirty,' 3 and the new California Code sets the
maximum at ten,' 4 as does Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code,'" which gives such corporations the option of being taxed as
partnerships-i.e. the corporation itself pays no income -tax, but its
10. See id. §§ 4.04-.05.
11. See generally id. §§ 1.01, 9.07.
12. See generally Note, Going Private, 84 YALE LJ. 903 (1975). Typically, a close
corporation makes a public issue at a time when stock prices are high. Thereafter the
market price of the stock declines to a level below its intrinsic value-not necessarily
because of the controlling stockholders' manipulations-and the corporation makes a
tender offer in cash or debentures, at a price somewhat above the current market. The
public shareholders are under considerable pressure to tender their stock, because if most
of the fellows tender, the stock will be delisted and may become hard to sell, even over
the counter. Professor O'Neal seems to share the view of Commissioner A. A. Sommer,
Jr. of the SEC that "when a corporation chooses to tap public sources of money, it makes
a commitment that, absent the most compelling business justifications, management and
those in control will do nothing to interfere with the liquidity of the public investment or
the protection afforded the public by the federal securities laws." O'NEAL § 5.32, at 364.
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (1974).
14. Ch. 682, § 158, [1975] Cal. Laws 1800, 1805.
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79.
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income is taxed currently to the stockholders, in proportion to their
holdings. (Subchapter S may set the stage for a peculiarly painful
squeezing, in which the victim is compelled to pay tax on income which
the controlling stockholders, who typically draw substantial salaries
from the corporation, refuse to distribute as dividends.16 )
As a rough generalization, a close corporation is one in which all
the stockholders know each other by sight and, more often than not, are
related by blood or marriage. It is notorious that no feuds are so
venomous as those within families, and the close corporation is often a
Petri dish for the cultivation of every known strain of human vindictive-
ness, greed, and chicanery. It has been said that God made the country,
man made the city, and the Devil made the small town. 7 God has little
to do with the creation of corporations, public or close, but the Devil
certainly seems to take an interest in the workings of family corpora-
tions. Balzac or Trollope would have found this book a rich source of
material.
Professor O'Neal very logically starts by describing the causes of
squeeze-outs' 8 -avarice, family quarrels, disagreements over business
policy, lack of business talent of some stockholders and an excess of it in
others: the motivations are human and therefore almost infinite. In-
stead of confining himself to the reported decisions of the courts, which
often give a dry and uninformative version of the facts, he has made an
extensive canvass of practicing lawyers, whose experiences and insights
(often necessarily anonymous) give the book a special utility.' 9 Some
causes, of course, are so common as to be almost normal--certainly
common enough so that advance provision can be made by the founders
of the business. After two or three generations, some branches of the
family will lack heirs who have the desire and capacity to participate
actively in the business. But some of them may need dividends, and all
of them want them. The active stockholders, who control the board of
directors and hold the corporate jobs, regard their cousins and in-laws as
parasites and have no incentive to put themselves into higher tax brack-
ets by declaring dividends. Their obvious temptation is to squeeze out
16. See O'NAL §§ 3.04, 6.07.
17. East Anglian Daily Times, May 20, 1922 ("God made the country; man the
town; the devil the little country town."); see W. COWPER, THE TASK bk. 1, at 40 (1785)
("God made the country, and man made the town."); M. VARRONIS, RERUM RusTicARum
LmRI TRES 113 (G. Goetz ed. 1912) ("divina natura dedit agros, ars humana aedificavit
urbes").
18. O'NEAL ch.2.
19. His sources include not only lawyers and businessmen, but also Ann Landers.
whose column once gave very sensible business advice in a typical family business row.
Id. § 2.11, at 32 n.3.
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the inactive minority shareholders, and, when they or their heirs are
ready to get out of the business, sell the stock, with the appreciation in
its value being taxed at capital gains rates or (if the stock is not sold
until after death) not taxed at all. (In fairness, however, the book
notes that there are situations in which a minority stockholder makes
himself so obnoxious, and interferes so disastrously with the conduct of
the business, that his elimination is thoroughly justified, provided that
he receives a fair price for his shares.)20 Professor O'Neal devotes four
lengthy chapters2 ' to a catalogue and description of literally dozens of
squeeze-out techniques. Some are truly fiendish, such as the amend-
ment of the charter, permitted in some states, to make stock assessable:
an assessment can compel the minority to choose between getting out
and making an additional investment on which there is no hope of
return.2 2 Or the majority may dilute -the interest of the minority to the
vanishing point by issuing to themselves large quantities of new stock;
even if the minority have a preemptive right to purchase their pro rata
shares of the new issue (which is often not the case), they will have
trouble raising the cash. The simplest and favorite technique is splen-
didly exemplified by the justly famous case of Johnson v. Mansfield
Hardwood Lumber Co.23 Two members of the family, A and B, owned
fifty-six percent of the Lumber Company's stock and ran the business as
President and Vice President, at generous salaries. The other stock-
holders were a singularly helpless lot-widows, invalids, and the like. A
and B informed the other shareholders that an extensive reforestation
program would preclude the payment of dividends for many years to
come. A and B were not, however, insensitive to ,the plight of the
inactive shareholders; they caused the corporation to purchase the mi-
nority shares at $350-400, which corresponded to the book value of the
assets, $1 million. The offer was gratefully accepted. What A and B
failed to mention was that they had "struck oil"24 beneath the forest and
20. See id. § 2.11.
21. Id. chs. 3-6.
22. Id. § 5.05, at 224-25.
23. 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958), afi'd, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 885 (1959). It is mentioned in O'NEAL §§ 3.04-.05, although its full beauty is
not brought out.
24. A and B employed this metaphor in attempting to rationalize their actions to the
complaining former minority shareholders. 159 F. Supp. at 117. The defendants
claimed that after the squeeze-out they had discovered that the company's timberlands
possessed values which were previously unsuspected. It was, they argued, as if the
company had discovered oil on its property after the stock purchases. In fact, the
defendants had themselves created the "oil" in anticipation of the squeeze-out by
purchasing much of the company's milling requirement from outside sources. The




that they had already been offered $5 million for their own shares.
Having acquired 100 percent of the stock, they sold the assets for a price
which yielded $2,000 per share. This was too crude even for the
common law, and A and B were compelled to choose between rescission
and paying the minority the difference between $350 and $2,000 per
share. The district court spoke of "fraud," "grasping greed," and
"moral bankruptcy;" the Fifth Circuit, though it softened the pejora-
tives, affirmed.
But in all too many cases the oppressed stockholder's remedies
under state law have proved inadequate.2 5 Enforcement of the stock-
holder's right under state law to inspect the corporate books and records
is slow, costly, and uncertain. Courts are reluctant to find that failure
to declare dividends is in "bad faith" and to order a pay-out, even in
cases where it is fairly obvious that a squeeze-out is in progress.26
Professor O'Neal concludes that that protean remedy for maltreated in-
vestors, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, may well be the squeezee's best
chance.2 T In one case, a federal district court in Georgia held that the
majority shareholders' utilization of a state "short merger" statute
(which permits the owners of a large majority, such as eighty-five or
ninety percent, of the stock to merge the company into a new corpora-
tion, all of whose stock they own, giving the minority the fair cash value
of their shares rather than stock in the new company, to eliminate a
minority shareholder) violated section 10(b), even though there had
been no deceit or nondisclosure, and the cash price was fair s This
seems to me a very questionable extension of the antifraud provisions of
section 10(b), but it demonstrates that some federal courts are as ready
to devise new uses of section 10(b) for the protection of stockholders in
close corporations as they are to do so for the benefit of public investors.
But despite the better protection against squeeze-outs and other
forms of oppression which is offered by the federal securities laws, it is
probably still true that the best protection for minority stockholders of
close corporations lies in preventive medicine. Professor O'Neal makes
many valuable suggestions for charter and contract provisions which can
save present and future minority or inactive stockholders from the varie-
25. See, e.g., O'NEAL §§ 3.03, 3.05, 3.08 & ch. 7 passim.
26. See, e.g., Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947); O'NEAL §§
3.04-.05.
27. See O'NA.L § 7.09.
28. Bryan v. Brock & Bevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, but only on the ground that Georgia law did not permit the use of the
statute for the sole purpose of effecting a squeeze-out. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
see O'Na L § 7.09, at 469-70.
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ties of corporate karate he has earlier described. 9 For example, a
founder mindful of the welfare of all his descendants may create two
classes of stock, leaving common stock to those who are active in the
business and cumulative preferred (nonvoting, except that if no divi-
dends are paid for X years, the preferred may elect a majority of the
directors) to those who are not.30 Additionally, as he has often (and
with some success) done before, the author urges various statutory
reforms, calculated to protect even -those minority stockholders whose
progenitors lacked the foresight to consult a competent lawyer.
All in all, Professor O'Nears book is scholarly, exhaustive, and
even (to the student of human rascality) entertaining. It deserves a
place in the library of any lawyer whose clients include close corpora-
tions, or minority stockholders vulnerable to oppression. That is to say,
most lawyers.
29. See O'NEAL ch. 8 passim.
30. Id. § 2.03, at 16.
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